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NOTES
THE VIRGINIA PASSENGER RATE CASES.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Company, etc., etc., is
of interest in determining the power of the Federal Courts to
enjoin the actions of state rate-making commissions.
It has already been decided that such commissions cannot
be enjoined from establishing and fixing rates, on the ground
that to grant an injunction would be to restrain legislation.'
But on the other hand an injunction will issue to restrain the
'McChord v. Louisville, etc., Railroad Company, 183 U. S. 483 (19oi).
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enforcement of the order when fixed if the rates are so low
as to be confiscatory.
2
The Constitution of Virginia 3 provides for a Corporation
Commission. The Commission, among other things, has power
to fix rates for transportation. The method of procedure is
briefly as follows: Notice is first given of the contemplated
action; the Commission then hears objections and evidence
against the proposed change. If an order is passed it is pub-
lished and then goes into effect. An appeal is given as of right
to any person deeming himself aggrieved by such action and
to the Commonwealth. 4 The appeal is directly to the Court
of Appeals of the State and this Court may substitute for
the order of the Commission such order as in its opinion the
Commission should have made, and "such substituted order
shall have the same force and effect (and none other) as if
it had been entered by the Commission at the time the original
order appealed from was entered." 5 During the appeal a
supersedeas may be granted under certain conditions.
If no appeal is brought within six months the order of the
Commission is final. The Commission is also given power to
enforce its orders, and to hear and try cases arising under
them.
The Prentis case arose as follows: A preliminary hearing
was held at which the six railroad companies, that ultimately
came before the Supreme Court, gave evidence. The Commis-
sion then entered an order lowering the passenger rates of
these railroad companies. Publication of the order was
directed, and at this stage the six companies filed bills in the
Circuit Court of the United States to restrain the members of
the Commission from publishing or taking any other steps to
enforce the order on the ground that the rates fixed by the
order were confiscatory. The Commission pleaded among
other things that the proceedings before them were proceedings
in a court of the state, which the courts of the United States
were forbidden to enjoin." The Circuit Court granted the
injunction. The Supreme Court 7 reversed the decree of the
Circuit Court on the ground that the fixing of rates is a legisla-
'Reagan v. Trust Company, 154 U. S. 362 (1893). See also Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt, 98 Fed. 335.
'Sections 155 and 156.
'Constitution of Va., sec. i56d and Pollard's Code, sec. 13I3a (34).
'Constitution of Va., sec. I56g.
'Revised Statutes, par. 72o.
'Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion.
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tive act, and that the railroad companies should have appealed
to the Court of Appeals of Virginia to make final the legisla-
tive act.
The Court assumed that some of the powers of the Commis-
sion are judicial, such as the power to hear cases arising under
their orders when the rates should be finally fixed. But until
the rates are fixed the Commission is only acting as a legisla-
tive body. The distinction between legislative and judicial acts
is thus stated: "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and
enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and
under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and
end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and
changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be ap-
plied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its
power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule
for the future, and therefore is an act legislative and not
judicial in kind." And in another part of the opinion: "The
nature of the final act determines the nature of the previous
inquiry. So when the final act is legislative the decision which
induces it cannot be judicial in the practical sense, although
the questions considered might be the same that would arise
in the trial of a case." It follows that when an appeal from
the order of the Commission is taken, and a supersedeas
granted, the Court of Appeals becomes the body that fixes the
rate and its decision, therefore, must be legislative, and in the
words of the Court: "It seems to us only a just recognition of
the solicitude with which their (the companies') rights have
been guarded, that they should make sure that the State in its
final legislative action would not respect what they think their
rights to be, before resorting to the Courts of the United
States." The Court has to admit that it cannot be stated as a
general proposition that a right to resort to the Federal Courts
must depend on whether the complainant has used every ef-
fort to prevent unconstitutional legislation. "But this case can
hardly be disposed of on purely general principles. The ques-
tion that we are considering may be termed a question of
equitable fitness or propriety, and must be answered on the
particular facts. The establishment of railroad rates is not
like a law that affects private persons who may never have
heard of it till it was passed." The Court admits, however,
that if the Court of Appeals affirms a rate, or makes one which
is confiscatory, an injtinction will issue to restrain its
enforcement.
The difference between this case and cases where a corpora-
tion commission has been restrained is brought out by a com-
NOTES
parison with Reagan v. Trust Co.8 In that case an appeal was
allowed from the rates fixed by the Commission to certain
courts, but no provision was made that these courts could
modify or revise the order of the Commission. The Supreme
Court of the United States declared that the rates fixed were
unreasonable and therefore of no effect, but that it could not
fix rates itself or restrain the Commission from establishing
other rates.
The Prentis case then differs from this case in the fact
that the Court of Appeals of Virginia, the Court to which ap-
peals from the Commission must be taken, when it hears such
an appeal is, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, a legislative body.9
Smythe v. Ames 10 contains some elements from both of the
above cases. In the Smythe case an act of the legislature of
Nebraska fixed the rates. The same act allowed an action
to be brought in the Supreme Court of the State to show that
the rates so fixed were unreasonable. If the Court found the
rates unreasonable it issued its order to a transportation board
directing them to permit the complaining company to raise its
rates to any sum in the discretion of the board.
Here we have power in the Court as in the Reagan case to
act judicially and to declare the rate unreasonable, but yet it has
authority to order a different law to be made, that is, that the
board shall fix a higher rate for that company.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that an in-
junction would issue to restrain the enforcement of the act of
the legislature, in spite of the contention of the board of
transportation that the Federal Courts had no equity jurisdic-
tion because of the special remedy provided by the statute.
Speaking of the appeal to the Court of Appeals the Court
in the Prentis case says: "They (the companies) might very
well have taken the matter before the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals. No new evidence and no great additional expense would
have been involved."
This suggests the question as to the relative advantages of an
8 154 U. S. 362.
'In Chicago, etc., v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1889), the Act of the
Legislature of Minnesota creating a corporation commission came before
the Supreme Court. By the Act the State Court on appeal is allowed to
modify the orders of the commission (see the report of the case, pages
431-2) as in the Prentis case. But the Supreme Court did not pass upon
the question now presented.
10 169 U. S., 466.
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injunction over the method of procedure provided by the Vir-
ginia Constitution.
The Constitution provides "' that upon the granting of an
appeal a writ of supersedeas may be awarded by the Ap-
pellate Court suspending the operation of the order appealed
from, until the final disposition of the appeal. But the com-
pany appealing must file a suspending bond, which has been ap-
proved by the Commission (or on review by the Court of Ap-
peals).
"The Commission, upon the execution of such bond, shall
forthwith require the appealing company, uhder penalty of the
immediate enforcement (pending the appeal and notwithstand-
ing any supersedeas), of the order or requirement appealed
,from, to keep such accounts, and to make such reports, verified
by oath, as may, in the judgment of the Commission, suffice to
show the amounts being charged or received by the company,
* * * together with the names and addresses of the persons
to whom such overcharges will be refundable in case the
charges made by the company pending the appeal be not sus-
tained."'
Suppose the Commission requires an unreasonable suspend-
ing bond, or makes such requirements in regard to keeping ac-
counts that the company cannot comply with them and at the
same time operate the railway profitably. In the first case, that
of the suspending bond, it seems that during the appeal the
rates fixed by the Commission could be enforced against the
railway. And in the second case, that of keeping the accounts,
apparently no appeal on this question is provided for.
The practical effect of the decision seems to be, that where
it is in the power of a railway company by reasonable means to
prevent a legislative act being passed against them, they must
avail themselves of these means before seeking the aid of the
Federal Courts.
THE LIABILITY OF AN AGENT WITHOUT AUTHORITY.
Ordinarily when an agent has contracted without authority
from his principal, the latter is unanswerable unless he sub-
sequently ratifies such act. An effort is then made to attach lia-
bility to the agent himself. Three situations may arise: (I)
where the agent knowingly and falsely represents that he has
authority from the principal, and a third party contracts with
' Const, sec. I56e.
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him; (2) where he honestly and bona fide, thinking he has
authority, makes similar representations; (3) where both
parties with knowledge of his lack of authority contract.
An indefinite number of variations of these three situations
may be conceived which in turn multiply problems. The
problems, however, in their last analysis reduce themselves to
the three states of facts mentioned.
In the first case there never appears to have been any doubt
that the agent is liable in an action of deceit.' His representa-
tions may be made either by word or conduct. He is none the
less responsible because he contracted with the thought that
his master would ratify his act and with not one scintilla of in-
tention to defraud.
2
In the third case he incurs no liability.3 Whatever may have
been the thoughts of the parties, as for example, to have the
principal subsequently ratify the agreement, if there was any
knowledge on the part of the third party of the agent's want
of authority he voluntarily assumed a risk and can demand
reparation from no one.
The perplexing situation arises in the second case, where the
representations are made in perfect innocence, with a total
absence of connivance. This question was met in the English
courts in the case of Collins v. Wright,4 where the agent was
mulcted in damages. Although morally exculpated from all
guilt, he had nevertheless caused the third party a loss. He
was held answerable on the ground of an implied representation
that he had authority. Another reason often advanced is that
the agent is in closer touch with his principal; consequently it
becomes his duty, if he chooses to act, to know whether in
fact an agency exists or not.5
Some doubt was entertained whether this principle remained
intact after the decision of Derry v. Peek.' This doubt was
dispelled in the case of Oliver v. Bank of England,7 when it was
definitively decided that whatever may be the law as to rep-
resentations made by persons in other relations, an agent is
I Kroeger v. Pitcairn, ioi Pa. 311 (1882); Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & A.
114 (1833).
2Downman v. Jones, 9 Jurist, 454-458 (1845).
Murry v. Carothers, 58 Ky. 7I (1 Met. 1858).
"8 . & B. 645 (1857).
'Firbank's Executors v. Humphries (I886), 18 Q. B. D. 54.a 14 App. Gas. 337 (1889). For an incisive criticism of Collins v.
Wright, see 18 L. Quarterly Rev. 364 (1902).
I i L. R. Ch. Div. (19o2) 61o.
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responsible for representations of authority which prove false,
however honestly they be made. The American rule accords
with this proposition."
Apropos of this, it may be stated that there is a line of
cleavage on the question of procedure. The majority of courts
hold that no suit can be brought on the contract, for the reason
that the agent did not make a contract for himself and there-
fore the courts will not make one for him The better ac-
tion is assumpsit on an expressed or implied assertion of
authority. 10
A variation of the third situation may be stated, viz., where
the agent discloses all the facts relative to his authority and
makes no representations. In that case the law says that the
party complaining has had full knowledge, or what amounts
to knowledge of the agent's lack of authority, and hence can-
not recover."
The question under consideration was before the Court in
the recent case of Sourwine v. McRoy Clay Works.12 The
plaintiff, a physician, contracted with B, the superintendent of
the defendant corporation, to attend an employe who had been
injured while in the service of his corporation. The plaintiff
was ignorant of the lack of authority on the part of B to bind
his principal, the corporation, to such a contract. Neither the
corporation nor B were held. In sustaining the demurrer to
the averments against B the following language was employed:
"If such want of authority was known to both parties, or un-
known to both parties-there being a mutual mistake-the agent
would not be personally liable." In support of this proposi-
tion a case involving an agent of a municipal corporation is
cited.' 3 Space will not allow a digression into the very proper
reasons why agents of public corporations acting bona fide
cannot be held.' 4 But these reasons, whatever they may be,
cannot be marshalled in aid of an agent of a private corpora-
tion, the defendants in the above case.
"Cochran v. Baker, 56 Pac. Rep. 641 (Oregon, 1899); White v.
Madison, 26 N. Y. 117 (1862); May v. Tel. Co., II2 Mass. 90 (1876).
'Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 461 (18ig); Duncan v. Niles, 32 Ill. 532
(1863) ;Hall v. Crandall, 29 Cal. 567 (1865).
1@Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494 (1873). See Pollock on Torts, 6o
note K, pointing out the advantage of assumpsit.
' Smout v. Ilberg, 3o M. & W. 1 (1842); Ware v. Morgan, 67 Ala.
461 (i88o).
'85 N. W. Rep. 782 (Ind. 19o8).
' Newman v. Sylvester, 42Ind. io6 (3873).
"Dunn v. MacDonald (1897), 1 Q. B. 40.
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There is considerable confusion attaching to the statement
quoted. If what is meant by the Court is the variation of the
third situation, of which we have spoken, we concede to its
soundness with all readiness. The quotation, when dissected,
may, however, with equal aptitude meet the second state of
facts. There is no particular magic in the words "mutual mis-
take," for they simply mean that the agent acted honestly think-
ing he had authority from his principal, while the plaintiff con-
tracted with him, likewise believing he had authority-in other
words we may call it a mutual mistake, or whatever appellation
we wish, but that does not make it any the less the second situa-
tion. In short if it be simply the second proposition clad in
new garments, it is, with due deference to the Court, a doctrine
the boldness of which is somewhat startling, for it is a decided
leap from the sound trend of authority, and militates against
the well-recognized rule of Collins v. Wright.15
MALICE IN CONDITIONALLY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
What is a privileged occasion and what is a proper use of
such occasion is decided differently in England from the gen-
eral authority in America. This difference may perhaps be due
to the long continued struggle for the right of freedom of
speech and the late recognition of the middle and lower classes.
England restricts the privileged occasion,' but is liberal in the
use 2 of such occasion; while in this country, the occasion 3 is
more broadly construed and its use 4 restricted. This differ-
ence has been overlooked by some jurisdictions which adhere to
the American rule as to the occasion but have followed the
English rule as to its use.
The recent case of Barry v. McCollom r follows this English
rule as to the use and holds that, "it is enough if he honestly
and in good faith, at the time when he made the accusations be-
lieved them to be true. This required nothing more than that
there were grounds for the belief which then seemed to him to
be sufficient and that his motive in making the publication was
18 E. & B. 645 (I857).
'Odgers on Libel and Slander (4th ed.), 248, 272, 282.
'Clark v. Molineux, 3 Q. B. D. 246 (1877).
'Townshend on Slander and Libel, 395, 414, 419.
' 18 Amer. & Eng. Enc. iO48; 25 Cyc. 411.
57o Atl. (Conn.) 1035.
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an honest desire to discharge the duties of his office with fidel-
ity." "
It is-established in England that "honest" belief is all that
is necessary where the use is in "good faith." 6 Stupidity, ob-
stinancy, or reasonableness of the belief are not considered.
7
There are some caseswhich appear to hold that there must be
some grounds for the assertion; that they should not be made
wantonly or recklessly; and that they must be warranted by
some circumstances reasonably arousing suspicion.8 In slander
to title 9 and accusations against public officers, 10 reasonable
and probable cause appear to be necessary.* This English rule
obtains in New York, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Virginia, and
other states."1
The so-called "Pennsylvania rule" 12 that libel and slander are
governed by the same rules as malicious prosecution, requiring
reasonable and probable cause for the belief, is followed by
the majority of jurisdictions in this country.'3 A false as-
sertion, manifestly injurious to the rights of another, is gen-
erally ground for a cause of action except where public policy
has denied such right. For the protection of society, an ab-
solute right to accuse before a public judicial officer has been
granted, and malice is immaterial. It was found that the pro-
tection of private interests sometimes required that accusations
be made; and from this grew the conditional privilege. With
the development of our elective system and the increased as-
sociation of individuals for social, professional, or business
reasons, the scope of an interest common to two or more
widened and the conditional privilege increased more in Ameri-
ica than in England.
Broad general principles of law should, when possible, con-
trol the question; what is and has been primarily a tort should
be treated and controlled as such; special rules for particular
kinds of torts should be avoided if possible. Reasonable and
probable cause, care, or prudence have always been the criteria
'Clark v. Molineux, supra.
' Pater v. Baker, 3 C. B. 86o (1847) ; Hesketh v. Brindle, 4 T. L. R'99 (i888).
'Odgers, 340, 342.
'Leslie v. Cave, 3 T. L. R. 584 (1887).
Odgers, 342; Howard v. Thompson, 2z Wend. 319 (1839).
18 Amer. & Eng.. Enc. io48.
"Briggs v. Garrett, ii Pa. 404 (1836); White v. Nicholls, 3 How.
267 (1845).
"Newell on Libel and Slander, 476, et seq.
in the exercise of the right to do injury to another. "Good
faith," "honesty," and "bona fides" are not generally any justi-
fication for a direct and intended injury to the personal or
property rights of another. Unless imperative public policy
demands such freedom of speech or press, it should not be
any justification in the case of libel or slander. It is difficult
to discover, in this country at least, the public policy which de-
mands that the honest belief and good faith of one who has
not based such belief on reasonable and probable cause, or due
care, should be permitted to deprive the teacher, or other pro-
fessional person, of the means of following his calling, the
business man of continuing his business, the public candidate
of living among his fellows with respect, or the servant of
the opportunity of employment.
Mr. Justice Holmes has well said,14 "Good faith is not a
sufficient answer for a libel. One publishes libellous matter
at his peril. Its liability is the usual liability in tort for the
natural consequences of a manifestly injurious act. Reason-
able cause is no justification where there is no privilege."
Though the statement made in deceit is not a manifest or in-
tended injury to the plaintiff, yet many jurisdictions hold that
the defendant must have reasonable and probable cause for the
belief in the assertion made; good faith is not enough. Even
accidental injuries are actionable unless the person causing the
injury be free from all fault. Carelessness which causes an
injury is generally sufficient foundation for an action. But a
person may through carelessness or negligence commit a wrong-
ful act, and honestly think or believe he is doing no wrong. In
order to clear himself from the imputation of carelessness, lie
should show not only that he acted in an honest belief that the
story communicated by him was true; but also that there
were reasonable grounds to induce such belief. "Honest be-
lief" should be founded on reasonable and probable cause.' 5
Lindley, J.,'6 in affirming a decision of Jessel, J.,1- held: "An
action for slander to title will not lie unless the statements made
by the defendant were not only untrue, but also were made
without what is ordinarily expressed as reasonable and prob-
able cause; and the rule applies not only to actions for slander
to title, strictly and properly so called, with reference to real
"Burt v. Advertiser, x54 Mass. 242 (i89i).
"Holmes v. Clisley, 121 Ga. 246 (i9o4); Toothaker v. Conant, 91
Me. 439 (1898).
"Halsley v. Brotherhood, ig Ch. D. 386 (1881).
15 Ch. D. 579.
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estate, but also to cases relating to personalty or personal
rights or privileges." Mere lies are not privileged and in the
absence of reasonable and probable cause, scienter should be
presumed.'
It is submitted that for a communication to be privileged it
must be made on a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and
must be based upon a reasonable and probable cause. Even
under the English rule the instructions to the jury frequently
go to this extent.'
WHEN THE IMITATION OF ONE MAN'S GooDs BY ANOTHER
TRANSGRESSES THE RULE AGAINST UNFAIR TRADE COM-
PETITION.
The law of unfair trade competition has been unnecessarily
confused by not keeping it distinct from the law of trade
marks. Thus it is common legal knowledge that one cannot
acquire a trade mark in the mere shape of an article,' but
clearly this does not say because the unfair trade competition
is by means of the similarity in shape of defendant's to com-
plainant's article, that it should not be restrained.2 Following
out the trade mark idea, however, there are decisions holding
that there can be no unfair trade competition in copying the
structural advantages of another's product, irrespective of the
intent to deceive the public,3 while other decisions reasoned
solely along the lines of unfair trade competition come to the
opposite conclusion on the same statement of facts.4
This confusion also explains certain opinions that have been
expressed "that there seems to be a strong tendency to-day to
admit that an exclusive right may be acquired in certain dis-
tinguishing devices, which would have been held some years
ago to be non-exclusive marks and open to all the world." ,
The cases cited as so holding are cases where "the principles of
unfair trade competition rather than those appertaining to
trade marks were the bases of judgment."8
"Briggs v. Garrett, supra.
"Regal v. Perkinson, I Q. B. D. 431 (1892).
'Moorman v. Hoge, 2 Sawyer 78 (C. C. A. 1871).
'Coates v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U. S. 562 (1892).
' Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Fred. Macey Co., ri9 Fed. 696 (C. C. A.
1902).
"Cook v. Bernheimer, 73 Fed. 2o3 (Circ. Crt. 1896).
'See article. "Fraud as an Element of Unfair Competition," 16 Harv.
L. Rev. 272, at p. 274.
'A Treatise on the Law of Trade-marks, by W. H. Browne, 2nd ed.,
sec. 8.9c.
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The two branches of the law should be kept clearly sep-
arated because the rules applied differ greatly. In trade mark
cases, all that the complainant need prove is a violation of a
right of his connected with a certain article of sale, and from
this arises a conclusive presumption that fraud has been
worked on the public because the trade mark being non-func-
tional no other result could be obtained by its use than the
deception of the public.7 To be sure, there is no property in the
trade mark as such but there is when it is used in connection
with an article which it designates; and for equity to intervene
there need be shown only that that property right has been in-
fringed.8 In unfair trade competition cases, on the other
hand, the complainant must show that the public has been, or is
likely to be deceived by the use of the similar article.8 There
is the same exclusive right that there is in the case of a trade
mark,--to be protected from injury to complainant's business,
but the fact of the likelihood of the deception of the public
must be proved in one case, while it is presumed in the other.9
From this it can be seen that while the law might well refuse
to grant one a trade mark in an unpatented device of mechani-
cal utility because this would make it exclusive in him and be
virtually giving him a patent, yet with perfect logic it could
grant an injunction to restrain another from using that device
if he did it in such a way as to deceive the public to the com-
plainant's injury.
It has long been settled that one shall not be permitted to
sell his goods under the pretense that they are the goods of
another.10 The basis of the equitable jurisdiction is the injury
to the complainant's business through the fraud on the public
and not the fraud itself that has been or is likely to be per-
petrated on the public, as is shown by the fact that no one
of the public can bring the bill unless his private business is
harmed." The ordinary case of unfair trade need only be
stated to be acquiesced in: the difficult case is where A makes
an article useful from a mechanical standpoint having no non-
functional characteristics to distinguish it and puts it on the
market without patenting it, thereby dedicating his newly found
' Hueblin v. Adams, 125 Fed. 782, at p. 785 (Circ. Crt. 79o3).
" A Digest of the Law of Trade-marks, etc., by N. F. Hesseltine, p.
89, and cases there cited.
'Kann v. Diamond Steel Co., 89 Fed. 7o6 (C. C. A. i898).
"Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66 (1842).
U Weemer v. Brayton, 152 Mass. ior (i8go). But see A Treatise on
Eq. Remedies, by J. N. Pomeroy, vol. 2, sec. 578.
idea to the public; B constructs and puts on the market an
article exactly like A's-under what circumstances if under
any, can B be restrained? It has been held that there can
be no restraint in such a case even though B sells with the in-
tent to deceive the public and thereby to trade on A's reputa-
tion.12 The reasons given are that the imitator has an absolute
right to do that which is complained of and his intent is im-
material; further, that this would allow the complainant in such
a case to gain a monopoly in a shape of mechanical advantage
to which he has no right without a patent. Another view
holds that there should be restraint where, the defendant has
the intent to deceive and thereby increase his sales by purchas-
ers from the defendants having "a reasonable expectation that
the ultimate consumer deceived by the shape will mistake" the
article for one of the complainant's. 13  Here it is denied that
the right of the defendant to copy is absolute, and the com-
plainant is not given a monopoly because he cannot prevent com-
petition carried on bona fide, and with no intent to deceive
the public as to the origin of the goods. In a recent English
case where the imitation was of a descriptive name, this rule
was applied."1 Where there is merely a copy of an article's
shape which is of mechanical utility and made with no intent
to deceive the public it has been generally agreed that there
could be no restraint ;15 however, in a recent decision the Court
granted a bill to restrain a defendant from selling automobile
searchlights enclosed in a shell imitative of complainant's un-
patented shell, although the shell had the name of the defend-
ant prominently appearing thereon as the maker, and although
the defendant had never represented that his lamps were made
by the complainant. Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw and Stamp-
ing Works, 163 Fed. 939 (C. C. A.). Unless here there was
imitation of non-functional parts of the shell or the intention
to deceive the public, which the statement of facts leaves in
doubt, the Court would be undoubtedly correct in saying as it
did, that "this carries the doctrine of unfair competition to its
utmost limit," although there would seem to be authority for
the position.'8
'tGlobe-Wernicke Co. v. Fred. Macey Co., i1g Fed. 696 (C. C. A.
1902).
Cook v. Bernheitrer, 73 Fed. 203 (Circ. Crt 1896).
"Reddaway v. Banham, L R. (i896), A. C. i99.
"Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 Fed. i6o (C. C. A. 19o4).
"Edison Co. v. Gladstone, 58 AtL 391 (N. J. Eq. i9o3).
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AcTs CONSTITUTING AN ASSAULT.
"I further charge you that if you find the defendant, with-
out justification, shot a pistol in the direction of the witness,
within carrying distance of the pistol, not intending to hit him
but intending to scare him, he would be guilty of a (criminal)
assault :" Held, to be a correct instruction. Edwards v. State,
62 S. E. Rep. 565 (Ct. of App. Ga., Oct. 12, 1908).
The above decision brings up the old but interesting ques-
tion of what are the necessary elements of a criminal assault.
Definitions of criminal assault are almost as numerous as the
cases. The one most generally accepted, however, is that of
Hawkins, "An attempt or offer, with force or violence, to do a
corporeal hurt to another." Bishop defines it as an unlawful
physical force, partly or fully put in motion, creating a reason-
able apprehension of immediate physical injury to a human
being. These two definitions differ widely. The one judges
the assault from the standpoint of the actor, the other makes
the defense depend on the outward demonstration and its ef-
fect upon the person against whom it was directed. According
to the latter view the defendant in the case under discussion
could be guilty of an assault only if in fact he did frighten the
witness-while under the former definition he might be guilty
of an assault even though the witness upon whom the alleged
assault was attempted was wholly ignorant of the attempted as-
sault, and therefore free from alarm.' It is difficult to reconcile
all the authorities upon this point. The question may be an-
swered either way according to definition followed. The dictum
of Baron Parke in a nisi prius case is that if a person presents
a pistol which has the appearance of being loaded and puts
the party into fear and alarm, he is guilty of an assault-for
that is what it is the object of the law to prevent.2 In 1843
Baron Rolfe expressed doubt upon this dictum,3 and a year
later Tindal, J., held it to be an assault only when the pistol
was in fact loaded.
The lack of uniformity of view is still greater im America.
In the case of Chapman v. State (78 Ala. 463), the Court
holds that the pointing of an unloaded pistol at a person
within shooting distance, in such a manner as to terrify him,
he not knowing that the gun is not loaded, will not support a
conviction for a criminal assault, although it may support a
'People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 525.
'R. v. St. George, 9 C. & P. 491.
'R. v. Baker, 47 Eng. C. L. R. 253.
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civil action for damages. The case of Com. v. White, iO
Mass. 4o7 arrives at an exactly different conclusion upon
identical facts. The one line of case proceeds upon the theory
that an act does not become a criminal assault because it puts
another in fear or tends to cause a breach of the peace; the
other upon the theory that, "it is not the secret intention of the
assaulting party nor the undisclosed fact of his inability to
commit the battery that is material; but what his conduct and
the attending circumstances denote at the time to the party
assaulted. It is the outward demonstration that constitutes the
mischief which is punished as a breach of the peace."
This conflict of view is due, in a considerable degree, to a
failure to discern the distinction between civil and criminal
assaults. The civil action for assault rests upon the invasion
of a person's "right to live in society without being put in fear
of personal harm." On the other hand the action for criminal
assault must, upon the fundamental principles of the criminal
law, rest upon the union of an act with a criminal intent or with
criminal negligence. The object of the civil action is to com-
pensate the injured party and therefore the law looks primarily
to him and to the effect of the defendant's act upon him, rather
than to the wrongdoer. In the criminal action the state is con-
cerned with the wrongdoer and if the act was done with the
necessary intent, the crime has been committed irrespective
of the effect of the act upon the witness.
That the "effect upon the person against whom the act was
directed," cannot be the test for a criminal assault, is shown
by the class of cases which hold that an offer of violence con-
ditioned may amount to an assault, although because of the
condition stated at the time of the act no fear can be said to
result from the act. "If you do so again, I will knock you
down," held an assault although no fear was alleged by the
party threatened. 4 All authorities are agreed that such a
threat and act constitutes an assault because it shows that the
defendant intends to apply the unlawful force unless the other
forbears to do something he has a right to do. The courts are
likewise agreed that the defendant who put his hand upon his
sword and said, "If it were not assize time, I would not take
such language from you," was guilty of no assault because he
clearly had no intent to offer corporal violence to the wit-
ness. 5 These cases clearly show that the intent of the actor
'U. S. v. Myers, i Cranch. C. C. 31o-
5 Com. v. Eyre, i Serg. and R. 347.
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and not the effect of the act upon the other party is the test
for a criminal assault.
Applying this test to the case in hand it is clear that the
defendant is not guilty of a criminal assault in shooting in the
direction of the witness, within carrying distance of the pistol,
not intending to hit him but only to scare him; unless it be
held that the intent necessary need not be to do corporal in-
jury but may be merely to frighten him. While the definitions
practically all hold that the intent must be to do corporal in-
jury to another, yet there are a few cases that hold that an
intent to frighten or scare is sufficient. 6
In the State v. Tripplett,6 the Court said, "when the atti-
tude or action of a party is threatening toward another, and
the effect is to terrify, the offense of assault is complete." In
State v. Baker,6 the Court held in respect to an instruc-
tion similar to the one under review that, "firing a pistol in the
direction of another with the intention of frightening him, or
with the intention of wounding him, are equally assaults. There
must be an intent to commit an assault, or else there can be no
assault. Committing an assault need not be wounding. It may
consist in frightening as well." Thus again we see that the
difference of view rests upon the difference in the definition
followed.
While the last line of cases is in direct accord with the
instruction given by the lower court in the case under consid-
eration, yet the instruction can hardly be reconciled with the
cases that hold that there must be an actual intent and ability
to commit a battery, and which seem to be more in accord with
the fundamental conceptions of the criminal law. That shoot-
ing a gun in the direction of another within range and intending
to scare him is a civil assault if it does frighten or that it may
result in a breach of the peace and amount to a misdemeanor,
is agreed. But such should not be held sufficient to sustain an
action for criminal assault.
The cases in accord and contrary to the necessity of a present
actual intent are collected in 4 Cent. Dig., Sec. 69; and in 3
Cyc. of Law & Pro., page 1020.
THE EXTENT OF PROPERTY RIGHT IN A TRADE MARK.
The facts in the case of Correro v. Wright, 47 Southern
Reporter 379 (decided in the Supreme Court of Mississippi)
'State v. Tripplett, 52 Kansas 678; State v. Baker, 2o R. I. :75.
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were these: A was a manufacturer of bottled drinks, using
bottles in which were blown his name, together with the words,
"This bottle never sold." He claimed to retain title in the
bottles and required dealers to return them to him. B ob-
tained some of these bottles, and was putting up a drink some-
what similar to that made by A, and was selling it on the
market, thus injuring A's business. A brought a bill in equity
alleging that he had a property right in the bottle and in his
trade mark, and asking that the acts of B be enjoined. B de-
murred, setting up among other objection s, that A was not
entitled to the exclusive use of the bottles unless he had a
patent right on them, properly registered, and further that
the relief prayed for was in restraint of trade, since it sought
to prevent competition. The Court overruled the demurrer,
holding that there is a common law property right in a trade
mark, and if used or imitated by others, restraint by injunction
could be had. The Court went on to say that the bill showed
that the bottles were the complainant's property, and that the
demurrer admitted that to be the fact.
There is no doubt that the complainant was entitled to an
injunction, as the acts of the defendant were clearly wrongful,
and intended to deceive the public.1 The case, however, sug-
gests several queries as to what the Court might have held had
a different state of facts been presented for judicial action.
The bottles contained the words, "This bottle never sold." Did
these words mean that the complainant never sold the bottles,
but retained title in himself, merely leasing them to the retailer,
to be in turn leased to the consumer, or did they mean that the
transaction between the manufacturer and the retailer was one
of sale, with a covenant on the part of the retailer not to sell
the bottles? The fact that complainant required his dealers to
return them would indicate that he leased the bottles, but al-
though the facts do not so show, the transaction may have been
one of sale, the manufacturer charging a price sufficient to com-
pensate himself for the bottles and their contents, and trusting
to have some of them at least returned. Looking at the trans-
action as a lease, the defendant, even though he may have
taken as a bona fide purchaser from the retailer, would have
been put on notice of the defective title by the words in ques-
tion, and would have had no right to sell the bottles, either
filled or emptied. But regarding the transaction as one of sale,
with a covenant on the part of the retailer not to sell the bottles,
the matter takes on a different aspect. The question then would
'Rose v. Loftus, 18 L. J. Rep. (N, S.) 409.
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be whether such a covenant would bind anyone into whose
hands the bottles might come, it being admitted that the retailer
would be bound by its terms.
It has been held that a covenant in regard to land, made for
the benefit of other lands of the grantor, will bind the assigns
of the grantee.2 It would seem, however, that in considering
the question of whether or not covenants run with personal
property, the courts have not used reasoning analogous to that
on which they proceeded with regard to covenants for lands,
but have held that either the covenant did run or that it did
not, irrespective of whether or not it was a benefit to other
property of the grantor. In a leading case decided in New
York in 1895," it was held that such a covenant did run, the
Court saying that "the party purchasing under such circum-
stances takes the property burdened with the contracts made by
its owner in reference thereto and which he had the power to
make." The weight of authority, however, seems to be contra
to this case, and to follow what is, perhaps, the leading case'
on the subject, wherein it was early laid down that a covenant
could not run with personalty. In a comparatively recent
case,5 decided in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in 1902,
the Court said that "a manufacturer may control by contract
the trade sales of proprietory articles to his direct purchasers,
but he cannot retain the title to his property, and impose un-
reasonable restrictions on its transfer after he has received the
price he designates as the full purchase price therefor." Look-
ing at the case of Correro v. Wright (supra) as one of out-
and-out sale, and applying the reasoning of the Pennsylvania
case just mentioned, it would follow that the defendant, not
having contracted with the plaintiff with regard to the bottles,
would not be bound by the words placed thereon by the com-
plainant.
This leads to a consideration of the ground on which the
Court mainly rested its decision, namely, that the defendant's
acts constituted an infringement of the plaintiff's rights in his
trade-mark. The defendant's acts were clearly restrainable, but
under a different state of facts, the Court's statement that
there is a common-law property right in a trade mark, use or
imitation of which will be restrained by injunction, might be
'Peck v. Conway, ii9 Mass. 546.
'New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Co., 83 Hun.
(N. Y.) 593.
'Spencer's Case, 5 Coke, 16.
5 Garst v. Wissler, 21 Super. 532.
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difficult to apply. What is the nature of that property right,
and to what extent does it protect the owner? In an English
case presenting facts similar to those of Correro v. Wright, the
Court said that an injunction would lie although the defend-
ant put a label of his own on the bottles marked with plaintiff's
design.' This would seem to indicate that plaintiff's right in
his trade-mark was not such a right as extended merely to
preventing another's product being sold as his, but was an
absolute right. To the contrary are the dicta contained in a
later case decided in the United States Circuit Court.! It was
there said that while "the defendant may bring into the market
these bottles, and sell them again filled with anything but
lime juice, he should not be permitted to put his own lime
juice into a bottle stamped with complainant's name and sell
it." It would seem that the above dicta would be the sounder
doctrine and more consonant with the real object of a trade-
mark, to wit, the protection given a manufacturer or dealer as
indicating the origin and ownership of his goods, and prevent-
ing another from palming off on the public similar goods by
representing them to be the goods of the manufacturer or
dealer in question. Besides this, the application of a doctrine
which would confine actions for infringement of a trade-mark
to cases where it has been appropriated and used to indicate
origin and ownership of goods, would be but carrying out the
policy of the common law, which has always been opposed to
monopolies, and would clearly indicate that the courts would
not permit the protection of a trade-mark to be carried to the
extent of interfering with legitimate competition.
'Rose v. Loftus, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 409.
' Evans v. Von Laer, 32 Fed. Rep. 153.
